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In October 2010 the Waitangi Tribunal released the first chapter of its long-awaited report of the 
WAI 262 enquiry into indigenous flora and fauna and Māori intellectual property. This chapter 
focuses on aspects of the claim relating to the Māori language and critiques the development of 
Māori and Crown generated initiatives to protect and revitalise te reo Māori, including the Māori 
Language Strategy (Te Rautaki Reo Māori). The Tribunal argues that the Crown must ultimately 
become Māori speaking. Consideration of this report and the legal protections in place for the 
Māori language reveals a framework that is incoherent, and largely incapable of achieving the 
Tribunal's goal, or even of fully protecting what the Tribunal described as "a taonga of quite 
transcendent importance". 
But even describing te reo as a taonga understates its importance. The language is clearly a taonga of  
quite transcendent importance to Māori, and few other taonga could rival its status. Without it, Māori 
identity would be fundamentally undermined, as would the very existence of Māori as a distinguishable 
people.1 
In October 2010 the Waitangi Tribunal released the first chapter of its long-awaited report of the 
WAI 262 enquiry into indigenous flora and fauna and Māori intellectual property ("2010 Report"). 
Arguably the WAI 262 claim itself has had "no equal in terms of significance to Maori since the te 
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reo Māori claim…".2 With such expectation, this chapter is a critically important first instalment in 
the report on that claim, particularly in view of its focus. The chapter focuses on aspects of the claim 
relating to the Māori language ("te reo Māori") and offers a critical snapshot of the development of 
Māori and Crown generated initiatives to protect and revitalise te reo Māori. It critiques the 
Government's Māori language strategy ("Rautaki Reo Māori") and the performance of the lead 
agencies in implementing that strategy. In addition, the report synthesises recent survey data and 
evaluates the relative health of te reo Māori, rightly skewering some unwarranted claims of recent 
success in Māori language revitalisation. The report, as might be expected, also offers some 
important, albeit provisional, recommendations for future developments.  
The Tribunal in the 2010 Report affords little space to an effective critique of the legislative 
scheme as underpinned by the well-outdated Māori Language Act 1987. In view of the importance 
of the legislative framework in the implementation of the protection and revitalisation of te reo 
Māori, this understated approach is surprising. The Tribunal does not, for example, recommend 
substantive amendment of the Māori Language Act 1987 beyond enhancing the role of Te Taura 
Whiri i te reo Māori (the Māori Language Commission).  
In addition the 2010 Report utilises a different rhetoric to the Waitangi Tribunal's Te Reo Māori 
Report of 1986.3 In 1986 the Tribunal used an explicit rights-based discourse to explain and argue 
for effective protection of the Māori language. The 2010 Report avoids a rights-based discourse 
almost entirely. What is required is less a focus on rights protections for an important linguistic 
minority, but an entire shift in self perception:4 
Fundamentally, there is a need for a mindset shift away from the pervasive assumption that the Crown is 
Pākehā, English-speaking, and distinct from Māori rather than representative of them. Increasingly, in 
the twenty-first century, the Crown is also Māori. If the nation is to move forward, this reality must be 
grasped. If the Crown is serious about  preserving and promoting the language it must also endeavour to 
speak te reo itself. This not only leads by example but provides symbolic as well as tangible support to 
keeping the language alive. Māori should be able to use their own language, given its official status, in 
as many of their dealings with the New Zealand State as practicable – particularly since the public face 
of the Crown will often be a Māori one. The idea of the Crown speaking Māori is of course not novel ; 
by necessity, this was the status quo for a large proportion of New Zealand’s colonial past. 
This paper argues that such a shift cannot yet be achieved, in part because the necessary 
protections put in place for the Māori language as a taonga under Article II of the Treaty of 
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Waitangi are incoherent and largely ineffective, precluding the use of Māori in the civic realm.  
Despite the language’s legally recognised status as a taonga, the statutory rights, set out in the Māori 
Language Act 1987 obstruct rather than facilitate the use of Māori in legal as well as more broadly 
civil contexts.  There is some cause for hope, particularly now Māori is used in Parliament, but a 
Māori speaking Crown is, as yet, a hope, not yet a reality. 
I THE MĀORI LANGUAGE AS TAONGA 
The critically important starting point for the protections now in place for the Māori language 
was the recognition that an intangible entity such as language was indeed a taonga for the purpose of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. Identification of any object or property tangible or intangible, triggers the 
guarantees in art 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi (with the author's emphasis): 
Ko te tuarua 
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangitira ki nga hapu – ki nga tangata katoa o Nu 
Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga 
Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi 
wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te Wenua – ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e 
meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai hoko mona. 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand 
and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of 
their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or 
individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the 
Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of 
Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may 
be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with 
them in that behalf.  
The Waitangi Tribunal, Parliament, and the courts of New Zealand, have all affirmed that the 
Māori language is, and was, a taonga for the purposes of art 2, and therefore subject to the guarantee 
of tino rangatiratanga in the Māori language version of the Treaty, as well as to the guarantee of full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession, as set out in the English version of the Treaty. That particular 
acceptance of the Māori language as a taonga for the purposes of the Treaty of Waitangi only came 
after a combination of events in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s brought the plight of the language to 
the foreground of public attention. Such events included the Māori Language Petition of 1972, 
signed by 30,000 people, which requested that Māori language be offered in all schools, and the 
Land March of 1975. Other political actions were carried out by activist groups such as Ngā 
Tamatoa, and societies for the protection of the language such as the Reo Māori Society, and the 
Wellington Māori Language Board, Ngā Kaiwhakapūmau i te Reo. In 1984 Ngā Kaiwhakapūmau i 
te Reo lodged a claim (WAI 11) before the Waitangi Tribunal. The Waitangi Tribunal subsequently 
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found in its 1986 report that the language was a taonga and as such, the Crown was bound by certain 
obligations, as a Treaty partner:5 
The evidence and argument has made it clear to us that by the Treaty the Crown did promise to 
recognise and protect the language and that that promise has not been kept. The 'guarantee' in the Treaty 
requires affirmative action to protect and sustain the language, not a passive obligation to tolerate its 
existence and certainly not a right to deny its use in any place. It is, after all, the first language of the 
country, the language of the original inhabitants and the language in which the first signed copy of the 
Treaty was written.  
The term taonga defies any exhaustive definition, and in summing up the findings of a number 
of Tribunal reports the Tribunal stated in the Petroleum Report of 2003 that:6 
Though the term has a number of other more mundane meanings, successive carefully reasoned reports 
of the Tribunal over many years now have come to treat 'taonga', as used in the Treaty, as a tangible or 
intangible item or matter of special cultural significance.7 
On the other hand the Tribunal has declined to extend the status of taonga to institutions or 
technologies used to protect or promulgate the language, reserving that status for the language (and 
its dialects) alone. So, claims for taonga status to be extended to wānanga and the radio spectrum, 
therefore, have failed before the Waitangi Tribunal.8  
The courts have also acknowledged that the status of taonga applies to the tangible and 
intangible, accepting both language and familial organisation as examples of intangible taonga.9 
Lord Woolf of the Privy Council followed the approach of the Court of Appeal as well as the 
Tribunal in the final Broadcasting Assets decision:10 
The Maori language (Te Reo Maori) is in a state of serious decline. It is an official language of New 
Zealand, recognised as such by the Maori Language Act 1987. It is "a highly prized property or treasure 
  
5  Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3, at [4.2.4]. 
6 See Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report (WAI 796, 2003) at [5.3]. 
7 See for example Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Kaituna River Claim: (WAI 4, 
1984) at [4.7]; Waitangi Tribunal Motunui Waitara Report (WAI 6, 1983) at [8.3(3)]; Waitangi Tribunal 
Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (WAI 22, 1988) at [10.22]. 
8 See Waitangi Tribunal Allocation of Radio Frequencies Report (WAI 26, 1990) at [8.3]; Waitangi Tribunal 
Wānanga Capital Establishment Report (WAI 718, 1999) at [5.6] and [2.1]. 
9 See in respect of language see New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General HC Wellington CP942/88, 3 
May 1991; New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) and [1994] 1 NZLR 
513 (PC); in respect of familial organisation see Barton-Prescott v Director-General of Social Welfare 
[1997] 3 NZLR 179 at 184. 
10 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) at 513. 
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(taonga) of Maori" (Cooke P [1992] 2 NZLR 576, at p 578 in the Court of Appeal) and it is also part of 
the national cultural heritage of New Zealand.  
The approaches taken by the Waitangi Tribunal and the courts have not been entirely consistent, 
with the courts having dealt more conservatively with the idea of taonga. The courts on the one 
hand, have accepted the notion that a river can be a taonga, but they have not accepted that iwi can 
use the taonga to generate electricity.11 The Waitangi Tribunal, on the other hand, has accepted that 
the taonga of geothermal resources could indeed provide the basis of a right to generate electricity.12 
In addition, New Zealand courts have also floated the idea that taonga may not necessarily be held 
by Māori, made by Māori or hold any Māori content or association.13 
In view of the lack of a consistent definition or approach in legislation and in view also of 
divergent directions taken in the identification and protection offered to taonga in the Waitangi 
Tribunal and the courts, it may not be surprising that New Zealand law has not coherently 
recognised the status of one specific taonga – the Māori language – within its framework. 
II LANGUAGE AS TAONGA – THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL 
The 1986 Tribunal, in its landmark report that set the ball rolling for recognition of the Māori 
language as a taonga, used the language of rights in determining the nature of the protections that 
ought to be afforded the language. The Tribunal stated that the guarantee under Article II extended 
to protect a general "right to use the Māori language". The Tribunal did not throw much light on the 
precise extent to which the Treaty itself could be considered the source of this general right to the 
Māori language, as opposed to being declarative of pre-existing rights:14  
Taking the two versions side by side it will become at once apparent that the Maori guarantee is 
significantly wider than the English version of that guarantee, which leads us to say that the right to use 
the Maori language would have been one of the rights expected to be covered by the Royal guarantee by 
those chiefs who signed the Treaty. Taking into account all the circumstances as they existed when the 
bargain was made we think that it is unlikely that many Maori signatures would have been obtained if it 
had been said by Captain Hobson that the Royal guarantee of protection would not include the right to 
use Maori in any public proceedings involving a Maori. 
  
11 Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20 (CA) at 24. 
12 Waitangi Tribunal Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative Geothermal Resource Claims (WAI 
153, 1993) at [4.4]. For more discussion on the consistencies and inconsistencies between the courts and the 
Tribunal in their approach to taonga see Arla Kerr "Taonga as Treaty Concept: the Approaches of the Courts 
and the Waitangi Tribunal" (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2006). 
13 See Jacinta Ruru's discussion of the cases of Page v Page (2002) 21 FRNZ 275 and Perry v West HC 
Auckland CIV-2002-404-002114, 15 December 2003 in Jacinta Ruru "Taonga and Family Chattels" [2004] 
NZLJ 297. 
14 Waitangi Tribunal Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3, at [4.3.6]. 
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Despite its acceptance that the Treaty protects a general right to the Māori language, the 1986 
Tribunal was reluctant to be seen as establishing an absolute right to the Māori language as 
modelled by other countries, such as Wales or Canada. The difference between a general right and 
an absolute right is not clarified, except that an absolute right would be the outcome of a political or 
judicial process from which the Tribunal appears keen to distance itself. The Tribunal appeared be 
trying to allay fears that its conception of a general right might lead immediately to unlimited public 
expenditure or indeed a politically problematic privileging of the Māori language in the public 
sphere:15 
The creation of absolute rights to use the language is however a political or judicial response to the 
issue. We could go further and promote for example, the Canadian model, which requires full 
bilingualism in all official documents. We do not think that approach is entirely appropriate to our New 
Zealand way or the principles of the Treaty whereby greater cultural sensitivity may be sought, not by 
prescriptive laws, but in an appeal to the strong New Zealand sense of fair play. Official recognition is 
one thing but popular recognition will depend upon successful establishment of a body to promote the 
language for both Maori people and New Zealanders as a whole, to watch over progress and suggest 
strategies that overcome the difficulties that are bound to arise. 
Regardless of its reluctance to be seen as promulgating an absolute right, the Tribunal clearly 
determined that the Crown was under an obligation to protect the Māori language on the basis of the 
Treaty-based guarantee. At the heart of some of the most influential submissions before the Tribunal 
was the notion that the recognition of te reo Māori should be progressively realised. The Tribunal 
placed significant weight on the submissions of the New Zealand Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists as presented by the late Martin Dawson in regard to the interpretation of the 
word guarantee within the Treaty text:16 
… the point was made that the word denotes an active executive sense rather than a passive permissive 
sense, or in a phrase "affirmative action". To quote from the submission: "By these definitions therefore, 
the word (guarantee) means more than merely leaving the Māori people unhindered in their enjoyment 
of their language and culture. It requires active steps to be taken to ensure that the Māori people have 
and retain the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their language and culture ...  
Also in evidence before the Waitangi Tribunal, Secretary for Justice, Stanley Callaghan appears 
to acknowledge that the duty was to be progressively realised and should not be frozen when 
exercised specifically within the courts. The correlative of the duty was, in his language, a right, 
albeit a limited one:17 
  
15 Ibid, at [8.2.9].  
16  Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3, at [4.2.7]. 
17  Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3 at [8.2.4] [emphasis added]. 
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... the Department accepts that it would be practicable and not prohibitively expensive to proceed along 
the lines of the Welsh Language Act provided that the right given is limited for the time being to a right 
to address the Court or give evidence in Māori. This would exclude an obligation to provide for 
transcripts and court documents in Māori as a consequence ... The time has come for change and we 
look forward to these developments as representing an important forward step in recognising the deep-
seated wish of many Māori people for their language and culture to flourish through its daily use in New 
Zealand ...  
The Māori Affairs Select Committee further developed this notion of progressive realisation in 
considering the Reo Māori Report and submissions on the Māori Language Bill. They observed that 
"full recognition of Māori as an official language should be a progressive and gradual policy to be 
implemented systematically as resources and public acceptance allow".18 While this observation 
surely was intended to deflect criticism for the Bill's failure to adopt all recommendations of the 
Waitangi Tribunal in the Reo Māori Report, it is also important recognition that the measures 
comprising official recognition (including official recognition of te reo Māori in the legal system) 
should not remain in a frozen state.  
Despite the Waitangi Tribunal's reluctance to denote an absolute right to the Māori language, the 
obligation, viewed by the Waitangi Tribunal is a proactive one to protect and sustain the language, 
imports with it, in Hohfeldian terms, the invariable correlative of a right that accrues not only to 
individual Māori but to Māori collectives.19 As identified by some academic commentators Treaty 
jurisprudence does reveal a Treaty rights framework and a concomitant set of principles.20 However 
the orthodox view of the Tribunal's role is that it may identify Treaty rights and, importantly, 
translate those rights into "the vocabulary of the legal paradigm".21 This translation process does not 
usually result in an exhaustive description or analysis of the content of any identified rights. 
Nonetheless it is evident that the Waitangi Tribunal has often taken the view that the Treaty itself is 
  
18 (9 June 1987) 481 NZPD 9337.  
19 Joseph William Singer "The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld" 
[1982] Wis L Rev 975 at 986. See also Ed Willis "Legal Recognition of Rights Derived from the Treaty of 
Waitangi" (2010) 8 NZJPIL 217. 
20  See for example Waitangi Tribunal (ed) National Overview: Vol II (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1997) at 
475–494. See also Matthew SR Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand's Law and Constitution 
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2008) at 113–129. 
21 PG McHugh "Legal Reasoning and the Treaty of Waitangi: Orthodox and Radical Approaches" in Graham 
Oddie and Roy W Perrett (eds) Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1999) 99; see also Ed Willis, above n 19, at 6–21. 
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a source of Māori rights, particularly of rights that can be determined where other doctrines such as 
that of aboriginal title may not apply.22 
III LANGUAGE AS TAONGA – LEGISLATION 
Ultimately the Crown's obligations were to be reflected, in part at least, in the Māori Language 
Act 1987. While the Crown did not adopt all recommendations of the Tribunal, of the five 
recommendations issued by the Tribunal, the first was directly relevant to supporting and 
recognising the use of Māori in legal contexts.23 The Māori Language Bill was introduced before 
the WAI 11 report was received by the Crown, but the Act was no doubt enacted, in part, as the 
Crown's response to the findings of the Waitangi Tribunal and the Māori language claim. It was also 
enacted in large part to address the findings in Mihaka v Police24 that the Māori language had, at the 
time of that case, no official status in New Zealand and therefore could not be a language used as of 
right in court proceedings.25  
The preamble to the Act recognises a duty placed upon it, affirming the Tribunal's approach, in 
stating that "in the Treaty of Waitangi the Crown confirmed and guaranteed to the Māori people, 
among other things, all their taonga: and ... the Māori language is one such taonga".26 In particular 
the Act was a legislative response that only addressed the first two of the five recommendations of 
the Waitangi Tribunal's report.27 The other major explicit legislative response to the 
  
22  See for example The Muriwhenua Report, above n 7. See also RP Boast "Treaty Rights or Aboriginal 
Rights" [1990] NZLJ 33 at 209. 
23 See Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3 at [10.1].  
We recommend … that legislation be introduced enabling any person who wishes to do so to use 
the Māori language in all Courts of Law and in any dealings with Government Departments, 
local authorities and other public bodies … 
24  [1980] 1 NZLR 462. 
25 See Pakitai Raharuhi v New Zealand (2003) 20 CRNZ 498 (HC) at [41] for the observation that the Māori 
Language Act 1987 was passed at least in part as a response to Mihaka. Te Ringa Mangu Mihaka, himself 
has often stated publicly that the case was "the straw that broke the camel's back" in achieving legal 
recognition of the right to speak Māori. 
26 Note that the Preamble of the Māori Television Service (Te Aratuku Whakaata Irirangi Māori) Act 2003 
states: "The Tribunal found that the Māori language is an essential part of Maori culture and must be 
regarded as a taonga, a valued possession." 
27 The second recommendation was for the establishment of a supervisory body that came to be known as Te 
Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori. See Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3, at [10.2]. Interestingly, a submission by 
Huirangi Waikerepuru to the Māori Affairs Select Committee considering the Māori Language Bill 
recounted that a second claim was apparently lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal on the Crown's failure to 
await the release of the Reo Māori Report before submitting the Māori Language Bill to the House. See 
Clare Tattersall "A Right to Language? Two Acts" (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2009) at 27. 
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recommendations of the Tribunal (and to subsequent case law) in the Reo Māori Report is the 
passage of the Māori Television Service Act 2003, a direct response to Recommendation Four; that 
broadcasting legislation and policy have regard to the Tribunal's finding of the Crown obligation to 
recognise and protect the Māori language. While it is important to note the likely influence the Reo 
Māori Report may have had on other legislative developments, such as crucially important 
amendments to the Education and Broadcasting Acts of 1989, it is equally important to note the 
limited scope of the Act itself. The Act, including its preamble, must then be read as just one 
important element of the Crown's legislative recognition of that duty. The mechanisms selected by 
the Crown to protect the taonga of the Māori language involve allocating official status and 
consequential statutory rights that provide standing and status to users of the language in very select 
contexts. Indeed the legislative response obviously dilutes the general right envisaged by the 
Tribunal. 
A Section 3 (Official Status) 
Section 3 of the Act merely states "The Māori language is hereby declared to be an official 
language of New Zealand". There is little guidance in the Act or elsewhere as to what this status 
really means. Certainly, this status is a step up from the earlier official recognition afforded Māori 
under s 77A of the Māori Affairs Act 1953, which was effectively ignored by the Court in the 
Mihaka case, which refused to countenance that such recognition might extend to a right to speak 
Māori before the courts.28 While denoting Māori as an official language was not one of the 
recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal, applying this status appears to have been a response to 
some of the Waitangi Tribunal's concerns from the Reo Māori Report:29 
Official recognition must be seen to be real and significant which means that those who want to use our 
official language on any public occasion or when dealing with any public authority ought to be able to 
do so. To recognise Māori officially is one thing, to enable its use widely is another thing altogether. 
There must be more than just the right to use it in the Courts. There must also be the right to use it with 
any department or any local body if official recognition is to be real recognition, and not mere tokenism. 
It is clear from the above extract that the Tribunal did not accept that official language status 
merely gave rise to a right to use Māori in the courts. This status was also important to enable wide 
usage in other civil contexts. However, the observations of the Secretary for Justice, Stanley 
Callaghan, before the Tribunal appeared to view official status only in the context of legal 
proceedings, although he also viewed such status as an important aim to achieve as a question of 
(albeit limited) rights or entitlements, and not merely to enable native speakers to be understood:30 
  
28 Mihaka v Police, above n 24, at 462–463. 
29 Te Reo Māori Claim, above n 3, at [8.2.8]. 
30 Ibid, at [8.2.3]. 
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... The present interpretative facilities when English is not understood and the various programmes 
which promote a much greater recognition and understanding of Māori culture do not of course meet the 
demands of the claimants that the Māori language be given some official status in our courts of law. 
While the present arrangements may provide for justice to be done in a strict, legalistic sense, a Māori 
may have an overwhelming sense of grievance and loss of dignity felt through being unable, because of 
fluency in English, to speak Māori in a court in his own land. That may give rise to such a deep-seated 
sense of injustice as to prejudice the standing of the courts in some Māori eyes. It seems to us that 
despite the strict logic of the present situation the time is now appropriate to consider change. Certainly 
the present situation is at odds with our bicultural foundation at Waitangi in 1840 ... 
Indeed the Tribunal's concern to enable the wide use of Māori through effective official 
recognition is not fully recognised in the Act. No guidance is given within the Act to explain what 
official status might mean. Judicial determination of the implications of official status has also been 
limited. Justice Fisher discussed the importance of s 3 in the case of Ngaheu v MAF and concluded 
that the official status of Māori was a "relevant factor" to be taken into account when determining if 
the court would use its discretion to allow the submission of Māori language documents; a right not 
supported by the Act itself. His Honour said:31 
One [relevant factor to the exercise of the court's discretion] is the declaration in s 3 Māori Language 
Act that "the Māori language is hereby declared to be an official language of New Zealand" and the long 
title to the Act which, among other things, declares the Māori language to be an official language of 
New Zealand. That suggests that although there is no right to file a document expressed in Māori the 
Courts should be sympathetic to the idea if in the circumstances it would be sensible and practicable to 
do so.  
In this case, at least, official status was considered a relevant consideration in determining use of 
the court's discretion. In the absence of further judicial determination of what this status actually 
means, it may well be that the effect of official status of the Māori language will continue to be 
determined primarily within the courts. This limitation does not reflect the Tribunal's preference that 
official status be more broadly understood, as described above. 
B Section 4 (Rights to Speak Māori in Certain Legal Proceedings) 
Moving on from the official status denoted under s 3, s 4 of the Act creates a statutory right to 
speak Māori in certain legal proceedings.32 It is important to know the exact legal circumstances in 
which this right can be enforced. Legal proceedings are defined in s 2: 
Legal proceedings means— 
  
31 Ngaheu v MAF (1992) 5 PRNZ 201 (HC) at 206. 
32 This right is also provided in s 24(g) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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(a)  Proceedings before any court or tribunal named in Schedule 1 to this Act; and 
(b)  Proceedings before any Coroner; and 
(c)  Proceedings before— 
(i)  Any Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908; or 
(ii)  Any tribunal or other body having, by or pursuant to any enactment, the powers or any of the 
powers of such a Commission of Inquiry, that is required to inquire into and report upon any 
matter of particular interest to the Māori people or to any tribe or group of Māori people: 
Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the relevant courts and tribunals in which the right can be 
enforced. All courts are included, but only a small number of tribunals are included. Schedule 1 
currently provides for Māori to be used in the following tribunals:  
 The Waitangi Tribunal 
 The Employment Relations Authority 
 The Equal Opportunities Tribunal [now replaced by the Human Rights Review Tribunal] 
 The Tenancy Tribunal 
 Planning Tribunals [now replaced by the Environment Court] 
 Disputes Tribunals established under the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 
Given that the Ministry of Justice now administers 25 tribunals and statutory authorities through 
its tribunals unit (not including the Waitangi Tribunal as a permanent Commission of Inquiry) this 
list is small indeed. The circumstances under which the right to use Māori in legal proceedings are 
also quite circumscribed. As stated in s 4: 
(1) In any legal proceedings the following persons may speak Māori, whether or not they are able to 
understand or communicate in English or any other language:  
(a) Any member of the court, tribunal, or other body before which the proceedings are being 
conducted 
(b) Any party or witness 
(c) Any counsel; and 
(d) Any other person with the leave of the presiding officer. 
(2) The right conferred by subsection 1 of the section to speak Māori does not 
(a) Entitle any person referred to in that subsection to insist on being addressed or answered in 
Māori; or 
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(b) Entitle any such person other than the presiding officer to require that the proceedings or any 
part of them be recorded in Māori. 
(3) Where any person intends to speak Māori in any legal proceedings, the presiding officer shall 
ensure that a competent interpreter is available. 
(4) Where, in any proceedings, any question arises as to the accuracy of any interpreting from Māori 
into English or from English into Māori, the question shall be determined by the presiding officer 
in such manner as the presiding officers thinks fit. 
(5) Rules of court or other appropriate rules of procedure may be made requiring any person 
intending to speak Māori in any legal proceedings to give reasonable notice of that intention, and 
generally regulating the procedure to be followed where Māori is, or is to be spoken in such 
proceedings. 
(6) Any such rules of Court or other appropriate rules of procedure may make failure to give the 
required notice a relevant consideration in relation to an award costs, but no person shall be 
denied the right to speak Māori in any legal proceedings because of any such failure. 
As shown above the right provided under s 4 is a right to speak Māori only. It is not however 
limited only to the submission of oral evidence or the giving of testimony in the Māori language, as 
counsel may also use Māori pursuant to s 4. There has been some judicial determination of the 
broad application of this right. Under s 4(1) the right to speak Māori in the Court extends not only to 
those whose first language is Māori but also to any eligible person. In R v Hohua Justice Fisher 
stated that the rights contained in the Māori Language Act 1987 were not only triggered when the 
user could demonstrate sufficient disadvantage in the English language:33 
The significance of section 4 of the Māori Language Act was that it conferred an additional right to 
speak Māori. This new right did not spring from functional necessity. It was not designed to bring to 
bridge a gap in the understanding of English. That much is clear from the fact that the right is there 
"whether or not they are able to understand or communicate in English…" (s 4(1)). The long title to the 
Act commences by describing it as "an Act to declare the Māori language to be an official language of 
New Zealand…" I take it that the Act was designed to promote the use of Māori as an end in itself.  
It is important not to understate the effects outlined above. By moving away from disadvantage 
as a prerequisite to access the rights of the Act, the rights, however narrow the application, are 
unqualified. This and other cases subsequent to the passage of the Act, according to Summer Kupau 
show that the courts have been co-opted into acting in such a way to preserve the language, rather 
  
33 R v Hohua HC Rotorua T13/90, 24 July 1990. See also R v Hillman [1991] DCR 68. There, the Court 
recognised the Act was intended to foster the language as a taonga. 
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than only acting in respect of the needs of individual petitioners.34 Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that the primary right preserved is only a right to speak, with no formal recognition of a right to 
submit written documentation in legal proceedings. Such submission may only take place as an 
exercise of judicial discretion. All such restrictions essentially undermine the Tribunal's original 
recommendation. Only spoken Māori may be used in the courts as of right, and only before a limited 
number of tribunals. Written Māori is not protected at all by the Act, and neither written nor spoken 
Māori is protected in dealings with Government departments, local authorities or other public bodies 
by this Act. These limitations have been in place and essentially unchanged since 1987. As observed 
by the Tribunal in 2010, the choice to use Māori in the courts has, in reality, not been made any 
easier by the existence of the statutory right:35 
But there are genuine constraints on the exercise of this right for example, the High Court requires at 
least 10 working days' advance notice of any intention to speak Māori. Under the Maori Language Act, 
court participants do not have the right to be addressed in Māori and there is no requirement for the 
proceedings to be recorded in Māori. Even in the Māori Land Court, applicants must inform the registrar 
of their intention to speak Māori in court so that an interpreter can be arranged.  Thus, it is no easier to 
use Māori in court than any other language besides English. In fact, foreign nationals are catered for by 
means of interpreters so they can actually communicate and understand proceedings, whereas the ability 
of Māori court participants to communicate in English is effectively excused by the provisions of the 
Maori Language Act. It seems to us that this falls short of the intent behind the Tribunal 's 
recommendation in 1986. 
Not only has the right which the 1986 Tribunal envisaged been limited and prescribed over the 
following 24 years, but there are one or two interesting examples of conflicting enactment of the 
right that deserve a little more attention. 
IV TE REO MĀORI IN PARLIAMENT 
The legal fora set out in the Māori Language Act 1987 do not include the pre-eminent legal 
context. Nevertheless Parliament is now one of the few arenas where an effective right does exist to 
use te reo Māori. In 1985, before the enactment of the Māori Language Act 1987 or the release of 
the Reo Māori Report in 1986 the Standing Orders Committee of Parliament made the following 
statement:36 
While the standing orders do not prohibit the use of the Maori language in parliamentary proceedings, 
the procedures of the House do not encourage such use. Speaker's rulings suggest that a member is 
  
34 Summer Kupau "Judicial Enforcement of 'Official' Indigenous Languages: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Māori and Hawaiian Struggles for Cultural Language Rights" 26 U Haw L Rev 495 at 519. 
35 Te Reo Māori – Pre-publication, above n 1 at [5.4.6(2)(a)]. 
36  (1 December 1987) 485 NZPD 1416 [emphasis added]. 
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expected to address the House in English if he or she can speak that language and that a member using 
an interpreter cannot have any extension of time for time taken up in making the interpretation 
…accordingly the committee recommends an explicit recognition in the standing orders that a member 
may speak in either English or Maori.   
Before this point there had never been a Standing Order to deal with the use of Māori in the 
House. Speaker's rulings had largely restricted the use of Māori to those who were not fluent in 
English. Accordingly Standing Order 151 (now 104) was enacted:37 
Speeches in English or Māori 
A member may address the Speaker in English or in Māori.  
This was a bald and unqualified statement of a right to speak Māori in the House. While the 
context is limited, it is far less bound about by restrictions than the rights to speak granted by the 
Māori Language Act 1987. The fluency in English of the Members of the House is of no relevance 
to the exercise of the right, as disadvantage in English is not a pre-requisite for the exercise of the 
right. As stated by the Speaker in 1997:38 
When a member speaks in Maori that member does so as of right. Whatever time is allowed by the 
Standing Orders for that particular type of speech, the whole of that time may be used in Māori. 
Interpretation into English is for the benefit of members who do not understand Maori and it is in 
addition to the time for which the member is entitled to speak.  
Importantly, the right to speak Māori in the House has been supported by the development  of 
resources to make such a language choice feasible. From December 2009 new simultaneous 
interpretation services have been made available for any Member who chooses to use Māori in the 
House.39 Evidence from Hansard suggests that the rights regime in Parliament, combined with 
growing numbers of Māori speaking members of Parliament and the influence of the Māori Party 
have seen Māori become a language of the House in a practical as well as a theoretical sense. The 
number and nature of the recorded occurrences of Māori language use from 1986 onwards shows 
just how the status of Māori has changed in a relatively short period of time. From 1986 to 2009, 
over 23 years, Hansard records at least 194 uses of Māori, compared to just 36 occurrences over the 
previous period from 1907–1985.40 These recorded occurrences include far more use of Māori in 
substantive ways, over and above the shared ritual components.  In fact recorded use of the language 
  
37  (24 July 1985) 464 NZPD 5898. 
38  (22 July 1997) 562 NZPD 3192. 
39 Māmari Stephens, "Tame Kākā Still? Māori Members and the use of Māori language in the New Zealand 
Houses of Representatives" (2010) 14 LTC at 220. 
40 Based on research carried out for the Legal Māori Project carried out by Phoebe Monk during the course of 
completing a summer research scholarship provided by the Tertiary Education Commission.  
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to engage in parliamentary debate increased in an unprecedented fashion and accounts for most of 
the growth of Māori now seen in the Hansard record.  All uses of Māori in Hansard are now 
followed by authorised translations, and it appears that all usages are now recorded, a far cry from 
the pre-1985 record, where Māori would be infrequently recorded, if at all. It is possible to say, in 
view of the supports in place for the Māori language in Parliament that it has become an ordinary 
language of the House. Perhaps in this one environment the Crown can be said, to some limited 
degree, to be Māori speaking. 
In comparison, the Māori language is not yet an ordinary language of the New Zealand courts 
(with the exception of the Māori Land Court). In addition to limitations placed on the use of Māori 
within the Māori Language Act 1987, another disturbing development underscores this lack of real 
and effective protection. The District Court Rules 2009 were amended in November 2009 to be 
consistent with the equivalent provisions of the High Court Rules. The relevant text now reads (with 
the author's emphasis): 
3.6  Translation of documents into te reo Māori 
3.6.1  A person upon whom in any proceeding a document is served is entitled to receive a translation 
of the document into the Māori language if he or she—  
(a) applies, orally or in writing, to the Registrar …  
(b) states a postal address for the service of the translation …  
(c) satisfies the Registrar that he or she is unable to read the document but could read it if it were 
translated into the Māori language.  
The previous text of this provision gave an unqualified right of translation into Māori for served 
documents. The reason for this change are not publicly available, and were not recorded in the 
minutes of the District Rules Committee. However, as the Rules are dealing with requests for 
translation, the re-emergence of the criterion of disadvantage as a pre-requisite for this entitlement is 
apparently justified because the Māori Language Act 1987 only provides for protection of a right to 
use spoken not written Māori. The general right envisaged by the Tribunal in 1986 has become well 
and truly split. As the above excerpt shows, indeed an entitlement that had been in place has been 
quietly dropped. 
The preceding pages have provided some examples that show that the protections in place for 
the language as a taonga are inconsistent and incoherent. The language right identified by the 
Tribunal in 1986 has been fractured in its translation into the New Zealand legal system; expressed 
differently in Parliament, in case-law, within the procedures governing the operations of the Courts, 
and within legislation. In this light, it becomes easier to see why the Tribunal in 2010 preferred the 
language of "treaty interests" to rights. 
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V THE TREATY INTEREST IN TE REO MĀORI 
At [5.4.2] of the 2010 report the Tribunal stated: 
Given the importance of this taonga to Māori, the Crown 's protection of it clearly needs to accord with 
Māori preferences – and, indeed, be determined in large measure by Māori ideas. This kind of 
partnership or co-ownership is inherent in the Treaty. Furthermore, the Crown must see Māori and te reo 
as not somehow external to itself, but a core part of the society it represents – and thus a key influence 
over how it conducts itself. And because the Treaty of course also grants the Māori interest a greater 
status than simply that of a minority group within society, the Māori interest thus has a corresponding 
claim to resources, both fiscal and otherwise. 
The 2010 report is also interesting just as much for what it does not say as for what it does say. 
In fact, the language of the report is telling, as it deliberately avoids using rights language, 
indicating a broader ambivalence about how best to conceptualise and articulate protections for the 
Māori language. Despite the undeniable influence and impact of the original WAI 11 report of 1986, 
this recent instalment avoids making explicit reference to language rights or any further contribution 
to rights discourse at all. In fact, as seen above, the report prefers instead to allude to the Treaty 
"interest" in the Māori language; a critical albeit small shift in rhetoric that raises some interesting 
questions about the suitability or ability of an explicit rights discourse to deal satisfactorily with the 
content of Treaty claims. The use of the phrase "Treaty interest" in this report locates it within an 
emergent Treaty discourse that eschews the language of rights and deserves some attention.   
A Treaty interest notion has emerged in recent Treaty jurisprudence in regards to identifying 
possible remedies where Crown Treaty breaches have left behind a Treaty Interest, which is said to 
create an entitlement to redress for the loss of certain legal rights.41 It is doubtful however that the 
treaty interest referred to in the 2010 report is directly related to the Treaty Interest as expounded in 
the Petroleum Report. Instead it appears that the notion of Māori interests in te reo Māori enable the 
Tribunal to sidestep the rights discourse started by the Tribunal in 1986. In fact, a distinction 
between the use of the terms right and interest in Treaty discourse is not always observed,42 even 
within Tribunal reports. Nevertheless it is possible to view interests and rights as entailing different 
levels of obligation.43 The fact that the 2010 tribunal eschews the rights based language of the 1986 
Tribunal may be significant, signalling an ambivalence towards rights-based Treaty discourse. There 
is much precedent for wariness about utilising the rights discourse to achieve effective protection for 
  
41 For general discussion of the Waitangi Tribunal's Treaty Interest as articulated in the Petroleum Report see 
Huia Woods "The Treaty Interest: A New Concept in Indigenous Rights?" (Working Paper, University of 
Waikato, 2006).  
42  See for example, use of the phrase "rights and interests" used in Matthew SR Palmer "The Treaty of 
Waitangi in Legislation" [2001] NZLJ 207 at 207–212. 
43  For a broader discussion of rights and interests in Treaty discourse, see Ed Willis, above n 19. 
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Māori custom, and indeed, for taonga. Arnu Turvey pointed to John Commons' 1924 notion of 
artificial selection as a way in which governments can create rights and undermine the holders of 
those rights at the same time:44 
As Commons has outlined, at the political level the law-maker determines the outcomes of human 
interactions by recognising values, principles and beliefs as being valid customs or rights. In this regard, 
Commons equates legal rights with customs, pointing out that the state, which has sovereign powers, 
creates rights on the basis of its selection of some human practices over others which it prefers on the 
basis of the outcome of those practices. This view rejects the positivist standpoint that rights have an 
inherent existence that it is the role of the state to detect and protect. When broken down to this level of 
personal preference the cultural values of the sovereign group become paramount. 
The 2010 Tribunal’s plea for the Crown to become Māori speaking is an eloquent one, and may 
offer a clue as to why a rights discourse is subtly eschewed.  If the Crown accepts its identity as 
Māori, and that such an identity is normal, then a rights discourse focusing on language protection 
for a linguistic and ethnic minority may well become unnecessary.45 However, until that acceptance 
occurs, a simple, effective, and well resourced framework of rights is very necessary to ensure that 
Māori can be heard in the civic realm, as shown by the experience in Parliament.   
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has highlighted, even if only briefly, that the protections for the Māori language as a 
taonga under art II of the Treaty of Waitangi are incoherent. While the Māori language has been 
accepted in the legislature and in the Courts to be a taonga, the statutory rights, set out in the Māori 
Language Act 1987 obstruct rather than facilitate the use of Māori in legal as well as more broadly 
civil contexts. The statutory rights fall far short of the broader right envisaged by the Tribunal in 
1986. Evidence from Parliament suggests that only an unqualified right may be effective in ensuring 
the language is used. Outside of Parliament however, rights to the Māori language have not been 
articulated or enacted in such a way that recognises the transcendent importance of the Māori 
language as a taonga. If, as the Waitangi Tribunal seems to be suggesting, a rights-based framework 
is insufficient, this paper contends an effective and coherent framework of protection and promotion 
for the language is necessary. Without this, Māori is unlikely to be used as a language of civic 
importance, let alone as a normal language of the Crown. 
 
  
44 Arnu Turvey "Te Ao Māori in a 'Sympathetic' Legal Regime: The Use of Māori Concepts in Legislation" 
(2009) 40 VUWLR 531 at 538. See John R Commons The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (The 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1924) at 299. See also Richard Dawson "Artificial Selection in Colonial 
New Zealand" (1999) 7 Wai L Rev 4, at 4–7.  
45  See also Professor Tony Angelo's article exploring the idea of attributing legal personality to taonga as a 
way of recognising a synthesis between the common law and Māori legal ideas.  AH Angelo "Personality 
and Legal Culture" (1996) 26 VUWLR 395–412. 
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